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It is inconceivable that, as this year comes to an end and planet Earth completes another full circle around the sun, the war in Gaza is still raging with devastating impact after descending into a multifront war for Israel.

When 2023 drew to a close, few would have imagined that, on the cusp of 2025, a ceasefire in Gaza would still not have been reached, many innocent people would still be being killed every single day, Gaza would be in ruins, many of its people would be displaced several times over and suffering from starvation and a lack of medical care, while the hostages would still be languishing in Hamas’ hands. It is equally mind-boggling that, despite playing a crucial role in this disastrous state of affairs, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still managing to hold on to the most powerful office in the country.

Israel could not have had a worse leadership to guide it through what has become its most harrowing period since 1948, nor could it be caught in worse political-social circumstances to face the challenges that have emerged from Hamas’ horrendous attack. At the end of the day, the fear that such life-and-death decisions might be handed to a prime minister who was also a defendant in a most disturbing corruption trial proved to be justified by the nightmarish circumstances and consequences that have come to pass.

There were very few who questioned Israel’s right to militarily respond to Hamas’ attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and go after its leaders and military capabilities, but that outrageous spree was no license to go after the civilian population and collectively punish them for deeds they had not committed, nor to treat them as mere collateral damage in the war with Hamas.

The Israeli government and its security forces have taken the view that almost everything in this war is permissible.

Yossi Mekelberg

Much of the way this war has been conducted was dictated by the initial failure to avert the Hamas attack. Since then, between the trauma and the will to avenge the victims of that attack, the Israeli government and its security forces have taken the view that almost everything in this war is permissible. None more so than Netanyahu, who is motivated by revenge and the prospect of redemption that would help him remain in power; and thus far he has managed to achieve what seemed impossible only a short time ago.

After all, it was he who masterminded the idea that funneling hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas would both pacify this extremist movement and preserve the rift between it and Fatah — and, by such a divide-and-rule tactic, prevent a Palestinian state from ever materializing. He could not have been more mistaken. Netanyahu misread Hamas’ intentions, weakened Israeli society and its resilience through his assault on the democratic foundations of the country and, whatever the faults of others in Israel’s security forces, it was on his watch that the defense of the communities along the border with Gaza collapsed within hours, leading to the biggest loss of Jewish lives in one day since 1945. This, on its own, should have led any leader with even just a minimal sense of integrity or decency to accept full responsibility and leave politics for good.

But this is not in Netanyahu’s DNA and his many and various denials of responsibility have become even more emphatic since he was investigated and subsequently indicted on three counts of corruption. His trial has been deliberated by the court for more than four and a half years, yet only this month did Netanyahu begin giving his evidence, which, by all accounts, has brought the entire country into disrepute.

Throughout 2024, it became increasingly evident that the aims set by Netanyahu at the beginning of the war — of eliminating Hamas and ensuring the return of the hostages — were not and could not be compatible. Moreover, to see Hamas only through a military prism and to ignore it as a political and ideological movement has been another conceptual failure. Additionally, his claim that only military pressure would bring the hostages home proved to be another of Netanyahu’s empty promises, aimed mainly at appeasing his base and his right-wing coalition partners.

The vast majority of the hostages released so far owe their freedom to a negotiated deal, while those killed outnumber by far those released through military operations. Meanwhile, about 100 still languish in captivity. From all the evidence available to us, including, and perhaps especially, the repulsive incitements by Netanyahu’s toxic machinery against the hostages’ families, it is clear that the government has given up on those in captivity in Gaza and would prefer to see them die rather than release more Palestinian prisoners or agree to a ceasefire.

What motivates Netanyahu is his desperate quest to stay in power and, consequently, he almost totally relies on the support of the far-right parties of Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism. If, in his earlier years in politics, his populism, divisiveness and fear-mongering propelled him to power, today the more he becomes entangled in his legal affairs, the more he and those around him are becoming increasingly venomous in their attacks on the judiciary, the various gatekeepers of democracy and anyone else who opposes them, while their behavior knows no boundaries.

Leaders of the settler movement are already circling over potential locations in Gaza to build settlements.

Yossi Mekelberg

Netanyahu knows that, in the Israeli and Jewish ethos, releasing hostages should be the highest priority, as most of the nation demands. Nevertheless, because of his dependence on a small group of right-wing religious-messianic zealots, whose dream is to annex the West Bank and now even the Gaza Strip, while making life a living hell for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in an attempt to force them to either submit to the settlers’ wishes will or leave, the prime minister will not allow a ceasefire deal to be concluded. To this end, he was even prepared to sacrifice his defense minister, Yoav Gallant, in the middle of a war.

Gallant was almost the only Cabinet member with substantial military experience and, despite his extremely hawkish views, he had the common sense and honesty to question the aims of the war, to call for a ceasefire deal that would also see the return of the hostages and to establish a state inquest into the disastrous failures of Oct. 7. In addition, he demanded that ultra-Orthodox youth be drafted into the army to ease the burden on those reservists who serve for months on end. These were all very sensible demands, but not in Bibi’s world, where they threaten his government’s stability.

Instead, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Israeli military is planning to stay in Gaza for at least the next few years, which is a strategic folly likely to be deadly for both sides. Leaders of the settler movement are already circling over potential locations in Gaza to build settlements and the even more lunatic among them were promoting the idea of settling areas of south Lebanon before last month’s ceasefire deal, which called for the army’s withdrawal to the Israeli side of the border.

In its war on Hezbollah, Israel’s security forces have scored considerable military successes, from the mass explosions of pagers to eliminating most of the militia’s leadership. However, despite these tactical achievements, there is a lack of any strategy to reach a lasting political settlement.

From Day 1 of the war, Netanyahu’s calculus has lacked a long-term strategic rationale. This is not by accident, but because the end of the war would likely terminate his political career and, in doing so, scupper his attempts to further derail his corruption trial. Matters have reached a point where one doubts whether he is capable of distinguishing between what serves him personally and what is in the national interest. Furthermore, following his recent indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, there is a genuine danger that he will dig his heels in even further, which makes the situation even more dangerous.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg